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Abstract: The paper is devoted to applications of modern variational analysis to the study of
Pareto (as well as weak and strong Pareto) optimal allocations in nonconvex models of welfare
economics with infinite-dimensional commodity spaces. Our basic tool is the extremal principle of
variational analysis that provides necessary conditions for set extremality and may be viewed as a
variational extension of the classical convex separation principle to the case of nonconvex sets. In
this way we obtain new versions of the generalized second welfare theorem for nonconvex economies
in terms of appropria.te concepts of normal cones.
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1

Introduction

The primary goal of this paper is to study general concepts of Pareto, weak Pareto, and strong
Pareto optimality in nonconvex models of welfare economics with infinite-dimensional commodity
spaces. To obtain new results in this direction, we employ powerful tools of modern variational
analysis dealing with nonsmooth and nonconvex structures.
The classical Walrasian equilibrium model of welfare economics and its various generalizations
have long been recognized as important part of the economic theory and applications. It has been
well understood that the concept of Pareto efficiency/ optimality and its variants play a crucial role
for the study of equilibria and making the best decisions for competitive economies.
A classical approach to the study of Pareto optimality in economic models with smooth data
consists of reducing it to conventional problems of mathematical programming and using firstorder necessary optimality conditions that involve Lagrange multipliers. In this way important
results were obtained at the late 1930s and in the 1940s when it was shown that the marginal
rates of substitution for consumption and production are equal to each other at any Pareto optimal
allocation of resources; see Lange (1942), Samuelson (1947), and Khan (1999) for more details,
references, and discussions.
In the beginning of the 1950s, Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1951) made the next crucial step in the
theory of welfare economics considering economic models with possibly nonsmooth but convex data.
Based on the classical separation theorems for convex sets, they and their followers developed a nice
theory that, in particular, contains necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto optimal allocations
and shows that each of such allocations leads to an equilibrium in convex economies. A key result
of this theory is the so-called second fundamental theorem of welfare economics stated that any
Pareto optimal allocation can be associated with a nonzero price vector at which each consumer
minimizes his/her expenditure and each firm maximizes its profit; see Debreu (1959). The full
statement of this result is due to convexity, which is crucial in the Arrow-Debreu model. Note that
the Arrow-Debreu economic theory and related mathematical results have played a fundamental
role in developing th~ general theory of convex ana_lysis that is mainly based on convex separation.
However, the relevance of convexity assumptions is often doubtful for many important applications. In particular, these assumptions do not hold in the presence of increasing returns to scale
in the production sector, which is widely recognized in the economic literature. In the pioneering
study of Guesnerie (1975), a generalized version of the second welfare theorem was established in
the form of first-order necessary conditions for Pareto optimal allocations in nonconvex economies.
Instead of postulating convexity of the initial production and preference sets, Guesnerie assumed
the convexity of their local tangent approximations and then employed the classical separation theorem for convex cones. He formalized this procedure by using the 'cone of interior displacements'
developed by Dubovitskii and Milyutin (1965) in the general optimization theory.
Guesnerie's approach to the study of Pareto optimality in nonconvex economies was extended
in many publications, for both finite-dimensional and infinite-dimensional commodity spaces; see,
e.g., Bonnisseau andCornet (1988), Khan and Vohra (1988), and their references. Most of these
publications employ the tangent cone of Clarke (1983) that has an advantage of being automatically
convex and hence can be treated by using the classical convex separation. In this way, marginal
prices are formalized in terms of the dual Clarke normal cone which, however, may be too big for
satisfactory results in nonconvex models as clearly demonstrated in Khan (1999).
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In the latter paper (its first variant appeared as a preprint of 1987), Khan obtained a more
adequate version of the generalized second welfare theorem for nonconvex economies with finitedimensional commodity spaces. In his version, marginal prices are formalized through the nonconvex normal cone of Mordukhovich (1976) that is always contained in Clarke's normal cone and
may be significantly smaller in typical nonconvex settings. Note that Khan's approach does not
involve any convex separation but employs instead a reduction to necessary optimality conditions in
nonsmooth programming obtained in Mordukhovich (1980). In Cornet (1990), similar results were
derived for somewhat different economic models by using a direct proof of necessary optimality
conditions for the corresponding maximization problems.
In recent years, it a lot of attention of economists and mathematicians has been paid to nonconvex models of welfare economics with infinite-dimensional commodity spaces; see, e.g., Flam
and Jourani (2001), Florenzano, Gourdel and Jofre (2003), Jofre (2000), Jofre and Rivera Cayupi
(2002), Malcolm and Mordukhovich (2001), Mordukhovich (2000), Mordukhovich (2001), Villar
(2001). In this paper we develop an approach to the study of Pareto, weak Pareto, and strong
Pareto optimal allocations in nonconvex economic models that can be viewed as a unification of
both the previous approaches discussed above, which are based, respectively, on the reduction to
mathematical programming and on the usage of convex separation theorems. The approach of this
paper relies on the so-called extremal principle in variational analysis that provides necessary conditions for locally extremal points of systems of closed sets and reduces to the classical separation
in the case of convexity. Thus the extremal principle can be viewed as a variational extension of the
convex separation to the general nonconvex setting. It goes back to the beginning of dual-spaced
methods in nonsmooth variational analysis and plays a fundamental role in many aspects of optimization, optimal control, nonconvex calculus, etc.; see the book of Mordukhovich (1988) and the
recent survey in Mordukhovich (2001) for more details, discussions, and references.
Based on the extremal principle, we obtain new versions of the generalized second welfare
theorem in nonconvex economies with Banach commodity spaces. First we establish an approximate
form of necessary optimality conditions for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations that ensure
the existence of approximate marginal prices under general net demand constraint qualifications
developing the qualification conditions of Cornet (1986) and Jofre (2000). In this result, marginal
prices are formalized in terms of Frechet-like normals at €-optimal allocations and may be naturally
viewed as nonlinear prices that support a perturbed convex-type equilibrium in nonconvex models.
Imposing mild sequential normal compactness requirements, we pass to the limit in the approximate conditions and derive an exact form of the generalized second welfare theorem in terms of our
basic limiting normal cone that provides an adequate description of common marginal prices for all
the preference, production, and net demand constraint sets at Pareto optimal allocations. In the
case of ordered commodity spaces, we justify natural conditions for the marginal price positivity.
The results obtained bring some new information even in the case of convex economies, since we
do not impose either the classical interiority condition or the properness condition of Mas-Colell
(1985) (we actually do not need a lattice structure of ordered commodity spaces). On the other
hand, our methods and results are not suitable for linear topological spaces that are well covered
by the conventional approaches in the convex economic theory.
Special results on the generalized second welfare theorem in both approximate and exact forms
are obtained for strong Pareto optimal allocations in nonconvex economies with ordered commodity
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spaces. A nice feature of these results is that do not require any qualification conditions, in contrast
to the cases of Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations. Such results seem to be new even for
classical models involving convex economies with finite-dimensional commodity spaces.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In Section 2 we formulate a general model of
welfare economics and discuss the basic qualification conditions needed in what follows. Section
3 is devoted to the tools of variational analysis including the extremal principle. Sections 4 and
5 contain the main results of the paper on necessary conditions for Pareto optimal allocations in
nonconvex economies. It happens that results for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations are
parallel and require some similar qualification conditions, while strong Pareto optimal allocations in
economies with ordered commodity spaces allow us to derive specific versions of the second welfare
theorem without imposing any constraint qualifications.
Throughout the paper we use standard notation. Let us mention that B and B* stand, respectively, for the unit closed balls of the Banach space in question and its dual, cl* signifies the
weak-star topological closure in dual spaces, and
LimsupF(x) := {x* EX* I 3 sequences Xk-+
x--tx

x,

x'k ~ x* with x'k E F(xk), k E IN}

denotes the sequential Painleve-Kuratowski upper limit for multifunctions F : X =t X* with respect
to the norm topology in X and the weak-star topology in X*.

2

The Basic Economic Model and Qualification Conditions

Let E be a normed commodity space of the economy E that involves n consumers with consumption
sets Ci C E, i = 1, ... , n, and m firms with production sets Sj C E, j = 1, ... , m. Each consumer
has a preference set Pi(x) that consists of elements in Ci preferred to Xi by this consumer at the
consumption plan x = (x 1 , ... , Xn) E C 1 x · · · x Cn. So the preference relation in E is given by
n general set-valued mappings pi : cl X ... X Cn =t ci without preordering, utility functions,
and conventional assumptions of the classical welfare economics; see, e.g., Debreu (1959). By
definition we have Xi ~ Pi(x) for each i = 1, ... ,n, and our underlying assumptions is that at
least one consumer is nonsatiated, i.e., Pi (x) =/:. 0 for some i E {1, ... , n}. For convenience we put
clPi(x) :={xi} if Pi(x) = 0.
Let W C E be a given nonempty subset of the commodity space called the net demand constraint
set. This set defines market constraints on feasible allocations of the economy E.
Definition 2.1. Let x =(xi)= (x1, ... ,xn) andy= (yj) = (yl, ... ,ym)· We say that (x,y) E
Tii=l ci X TIT=l Sj is a feasible allocation of E if
n

m

i=l

j=l

LXi- LYi E w.

(2.1)

Note that W can be formally treated as an additional production set. However, introducing the
net constraint set allows us to unify some conventional situations in economic models and to give
a useful economic insight in the general framework. Indeed, in the classical case the set W consists
of one element {w}, where w is an aggregate endowment of scarce resources. Then constraint (2.1)
reduces to the 'markets clear' condition. Another conventional framework appears in (2.1) when the
4

commodity space E is ordered by a closed positive cone E+ and W :=w-E+, which corresponds
to the 'implicit free disposal' of commodities. Generally (2.1) describes a natural situation that
may particularly happen when the initial aggregate endowment is not exactly known due to, e.g.,
incomplete information. In the latter general case, the set W reflects some uncertainty in the
economic model under consideration.
In this paper we consider in parallel the following three notions of Pareto optimal allocations for
the economic model & with the general market constraints (2.1). These abstract notions of Pareto
optimality (efficiency) generalize conventional Pareto concepts when preference relations are given
by some preorder and/or utility functions; see, e.g., Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988), Guesnerie
(1975), and Mas-Colell (1986).

Definition 2.2. Let (x, y) be a feasible allocation of the economy & with the property Xi E clPi (x)
for all i = 1, ... , n. We say that:
(i) (x, y) is a weak Pareto local optimal allocation of & if there is a neighborhood 0 of (x, y)
such that for every feasible allocation (x,y) E 0 one has Xi t:j. Pi(x) for some i E {1, ... ,n}.
(ii) (x, y) is a Pareto optimal allocation of & ifthere is a neighborhood 0 of (x, y) such that for
every feasible allocation (x, y) E 0 either Xi t:j. clPi (x) for some i E { 1, ... , n} or x )i t:j. Pi (x) for all
i = 1, ... ,n.
(iii) (x, y) is a strong Pareto optimal allocation of & is there is a neighborhood 0 of (x, y) such
that for every feasible allocation (x, y) E 0 with (x, y) i= (x, y) one has Xi t:j. clPi (x) for some
i E {1, ... ,n}.
For studying necessary conditions for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations (but not
strong ones as we will see below) we need some qualification conditions imposed on preference,
production, and net demand constraint sets. The following qualification conditions, required respectively for weak Pareto and Pareto optimal allocations in our economic model with general net
demand constraints, are in the line of the 'desirability direction condition' of Mas-Colell (1986)
and the 'condition (b.)' of Cornet (1986) used also in Khan (1999) under the name of 'Cornet's
constraint qualification.'

Definition 2.3. Let (x, y) be a feasible allocation of & and let
n

m

w := LXi- LYj·
i=l

Given c

(2.2)

j=l

> 0, we consider the set
b.c :=

n

m

i=l

j=l

L clPi(x) n (xi+ cB)- L clSj n (i]j + cB)- clW n (w + cB)

and say that:
(i) The net demand weak qualification (NDWQ) condition holds at (x, y) ifthere are c
a sequence {ek} C E with ek --+ 0 as k --+ oo such that
n

b.c

+ ek c

(2.3)

> 0 and

m

LPi(x)- l:Sj- W
i=l

j=l
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(2.4)

for all k E IN sufficiently large.
(ii) The net demand qualification (NDQ) condition holds at (x, y) ifthere are c > 0, a sequence
{ek} C X with ek -+ 0 as k-+ oo, and a consumer index io E {1, ... , n} such that
b.c:

+ ek c

Pi 0 (x)

m

+L

clPi(x)-

i:f:io

L Sj- W

(2.5)

j=l

for all k E IN sufficiently large.
Obviously the NDWQ condition implies the NDQ one, but the opposite is not true. When
W = {w} (the markets clear) and all the production sets Sj are locally closed, the NDQ condition
reduces to the 'asymptotically included condition' in Jofre (2000) and Jofre and Rivera Cayupi
(2002), which directly implies (2.5) in the general case under consideration. Note that Cornet's
constraint qualification corresponds to (2.5) with no set W, where ek is replaced with te for some
e E E and all t > 0 sufficiently small. The latter property holds, in particular, if either one
among preference or production sets is epi-Lipschitzian at the corresponding point in the sense of
Rockafellar (1980).
Recall that a subset n c X of a normed space X is epi-Lipschitzian at x E clD if there are a
vector v E X and a number 1 > 0 such that

x+t(v+!B)cn forall xE(x+!B)nn and tE(O,,).

(2.6)

When v = 0, property (2.6) is obviously equivalent to x E intD. If v f= 0 and n is closed, the .
epi-Lipschitzian property means that n is locally homeomorphic to the epigraph of a Lipschitz
continuous function; hence the terminology. Note that the epi-Lipschitzian property of n at x
implies this property of the closure clD at the same point, but not vice versa. It is worth mentioning
that summation of sets as in (2.8) and (2.9) below (especially for a large number of sets) tends to
improve properties related to nonempty interior, and that the epi-Lipschitzian property of sets falls
into this category. If.n is closed and convex, this property reduces to intn f= 0. For general closed
sets in finite dimensions, the epi-Lipschitzian property is equivalent to the nonempty interior of the
Clarke tangent cone to n at x; see Rockafellar (1980) for more details.
The next proposition, proved in Malcolm and Mordukhovich (2001), presents some sufficient
conditions for the NDWQ and NDQ properties and particularly demonstrates the difference between
the assumptions needed for these properties.

Proposition 2.4. Let E be a normed space and let (x, y) be a feasible allocation of the economy
[. The following assertions hold:
(i) Assume that the sets Sj, j = 1, ... , m, and Ware closed near the points Yj and w respectively.
Then the NDQ condition is satisfied at (x, y) if there are a number c > 0, an index i E {1, ... , n}
and a desirability sequence {eik} C E, eik -+ 0 as k -+ oo, such that

clPi(x) n (xi+ cB)

+ eik c

Pi(x) for all large k E IN.

(2.7)

Moreover, the ND Q condition is satisfied at (x, y) if a desirability sequence {vik} exists for each
> 0 in (2.7).

i E {1, ... , n} with some c
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(ii) Assume that Xi E clPi(x) for all i = 1, ... , n. Then the NDWQ condition is
(x, y) if the set
n

sat~sfied

at

m

.6. := :LPi(x)i=l

L Sj- w

(2.8)

j=l

is epi-Lipschitzian at 0 E cl.6.. It happens when either one among the sets Pi(x) fori = 1, ... , n,
Bj for j = 1, ... , m, and W or some of their partial combinations in (2.8) is epi-Lipschitzian at the
corresponding point.
(iii) Assume that n > 1. The NDQ condition is satisfied at (x, y) if there is a nonsatiated
consumer io E {1, ... , n} such that the set
~ :=

L

(2.9)

clPi(X)

i:f:io

is epi-Lipschitzian at the point Ei:fio Xi· It happens when either one among the sets clPi(x) for
i E { 1, ... , n} \ {io} or some of their partial sums is epi-Lipschitzian at the corresponding point.

It is important to observe that we do not need to impose any assumption on preference and
production sets for the fulfillment of both qualification conditions in Definition 2.3 if the net demand
constraint set W is epi-Lipschitzian at the point win (2.2). This follows from Proposition 2.4(ii). It
happens, in particular, when E is ordered and W =w-E+ with intE+ =!= 0, which is the classical
case of 'free-disposal Pareto optimum.' Note also that the material of this section holds, with
minor modifications, in general linear topological spaces equipped with a locally convex Hausdorff
topology.

3

Normal Cones and the Extremal Principle

In this section we present the basic tools of variational analysis used in the paper for studying
Pareto optimal allocations of the nonconvex economy £ from Section 2. Our main results are
obtained in Sections 4 and 5 in terms of generalized normals to nonconvex sets.

Definition 3.1. Let n be a nonempty subset of a Banach space X and let c 2:: 0.
(i) Given X E n, we define the set of €-normals to n at X by

NE:(x;!l)

:=

{x*

E X*llim sup
0
u-+x

(~~~~~~~)

:S c},

(3.1)

where u ~ x means that u ---+ x with u E n. When c = 0, the set (3.1) is a cone called the
prenormal cone or the FnEchet normal cone to n at X and denoted by N(x; n). If X rt n, we put
.NE:(x; n) := 0 for all c 2:: o.
(ii) The conic set

N(x; n) := LimsupNc(x; n)
x-+x, c.j.O

is called the (basic) normal cone to nat

x.
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(3.2)

In the finite-dimensional case X =
introduced in Mordukhovich (1976) by

mn,

the basic normal cone (3.2) coincides with the one

N(x; !1) = Limsup[cone(x- IT(x; !1))],

(3.3)

x-tx

where 'cone' stands for the conic hull of a set and IT(x; !1) is the multivalued Euclidean projector
of X on the closure of !1.
The set of c-normals (3.1) and the extension (3.2) of the basic normal cone to Banach spaces first
appeared in Kruger and Mordukhovich (1980). Observe that although the set (3.1) is always convex
for every c ~ 0, the basic normal cone may be nonconvex in common situations, e.g., for n = gphlxl
at x = (0, 0) E ffi 2 . This means that it cannot be dual to any tangent cone approximation of n at
the point in question.
Let us mention that for X = lRn the dual/polar cone to N(x; !1) coincides to the classical
Bouligand-Severi contingent cone, while the convex closure of N(x; !1) agrees with the normal cone
of Clarke (1983). Despite its nonconvexity, the basic normal cone in finite dimensions enjoys a
number of nice properties some of which may be spoiled by the convexification procedure; see the
books of Mordukhovich (1988) and Rockafellar and Wets (1998) for more details, discussions, and
references.
In the case of infinite dimensions, most of these properties hold true under natural assumptions
for a broad subclass of Banach spaces, called Asplund spaces, on which every continuous convex
functions is generically Fnkhet differentiable. By now this class is well investigated in the geometric
theory of Banach spaces, where many useful properties and characterizations of Asplund spaces
have been obtained; see, e.g., the book of Phelps (1993) and its references. In particular, Asplund
spaces are characterized as those for which every separable subspace has a separable dual, and they
include Banach spaces with Fnkhet differentiable renorms or bump functions (hence, all reflexive
spaces). On the other hand, there are Asplund spaces that fail to have even a Gateaux differentiable
renorm.
If n c X is a convex subset of a Banach space X, then both prenormal and normal cones in
Definition 3.1 reduce to the normal cone of convex analysis:

N(x;n) = N(x;n) = {x* E X*l (x*,x- x) ~

o Vx En}.

(3.4)

Moreover, for convex sets one has

No(x; n)

= N(x; n) + cB* = {x*

EX* I (x*' X- x) ~ cllx- xll Vx En}.

(3.5)

If n is an arbitrary closed subset of an Asplund space X, then there is the exact relationship
between the prenormal and normal cones proved in Mordukhovich and Shao (1996b):

N(x; n) = LimsupN(x; !1).
x-tx

(3.6)

It is also show in the latter paper that the weak-star topological closure cl* N(x; !1) of (3.2) gives
the 'approximate' G-normal cone of Ioffe (1989) while the weak-star closure of its convexification
cl*coN(x; !1) coincides with Clarke's normal cone for any closed sets in Asplund spaces. Note that
our basic sequential normal cone (3.2) may be strictly smaller than the G-normal cone (and its
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'nucleus' called the 'approximate normal cone' in Ioffe (2000)) ev~n in spaces with Frechet smooth
norms.
In the sequel we use the following two propositions involving the prenormal cone N(·; n). The
first one can be easily derived from the definition.
Proposition 3.2. Let X 1 and X2 be Banach spaces. Then for any nonempty sets Sli
and any x = (x1, x2) E S11 X S12 one has

c Xi,

i = 1, 2,

The next proposition provides variational descriptions of the prenormal cone and the set of cnormals (3.1) useful for economic interpretations of some results obtained in Sections 4 and 5. Given
a class S of smooth in a certain sense functions on the Banach space X, we recall that b : X -t IR
is an S-bump function on X if b() E S, b(xo) # 0 for some xo E X, and b(x) = 0 whenever
x lies outside a ball in X. In what follows, we consider the three classes S of smooth functions
on X: Frechet smooth functions, Lipschitzian and Frechet smooth functions, and Lipschitzian
and continuously differentiable functions. Note that every Banach space X admitting an S-bump
function from one of these three classes must be Asplund.
Proposition 3.3. Let n be a subset of a Banach spaces X and let x E n. Then the following hold:
(i) Given c ~ 0, we have x* E Nc(x; Sl) if and only if for any 1 > 0 the function
f(x) := (x*, x- x)- (c + 'Y)ilx- xll
attains at x a local maximum relative to n.
(ii) Let X admit an equivalent Frechet smooth norm. Then for every x* E N(x; Sl) there is a
concave Frechet smooth function g : X -t IR such that \lg(x) = x* and g(-) achieves its global
maximum relative to n uniquely at x.
(iii) Let X admit_ an S-smooth bump function. Then for every x* E N(x; Sl) there is an Ssmooth function g : X -t IR satisfying the conclusions in (ii).

Proof. The proof of (i) follows directly from the definition of 'lim sup' in (3.1). Assertions (ii) and
(iii) follow from the proof of Theorem 4.6 in Fabian and Mordukhovich (1998) for the case of set
indicator functions; see also Remarks 4.9 and 4.10 therein. 0
Our basic tool in this paper in the following extremal principle of variational analysis that
provides necessary optimality conditions for locally extremal points of set systems and can be
viewed as a variational extension of the classical separation principle to the case of nonconvex
sets. The reader may consult with the survey in Mordukhovich (2001) for more references and
discussions.
Definition 3.4. Let S11, ... , Sln (n ~ 2) be nonempty subsets of a Banach space X. We say that x is
a locally extremal point of the set system {0 1 , ... , On} if there are sequences {aik} C X, i = 1, ... , n,
and a neighborhood U of x such that aik -t 0 as k -t oo and
n

n(Sli - aik) n U = 0 for all large k E IN.
i=l

9

We say that {0 1 , ... , On} is an extremal system in X if these sets have at least one locally extremal
point.
An obvious example of the extremal system of two sets is provided by the pair {x, 0}, where xis
a boundary point of the closed set 0 C X. In general, this geometric concept of extremality covers
conventional notions of optimal solutions to various problems of scalar and vector optimization.
The following fuzzy version of the extremal principle was established Mordukhovich and Shao
(1996a) as a characterization of Asplund spaces.
Theorem 3.5. Let X be an Asplund space and let x be a locally extremal point of the system of
closed sets {0 1 , ... , On} in X. Then for any c > 0 there are Xi E Oi n (x + cB) and xi EX* such

that

xi

E

N(xi; Oi)

+ cB*

for all i

x]" + · · · +x~

= 1, ... , n,

= 0,

llxill + · · · + llx~ll

= 1.

(3.7)

(3.8)

(3.9)

Let us discuss conditions under which one can pass to the limit in (3.7)-(3.9) as c .j_ 0 and
obtain the exact/limiting form of the extremal principle in terms of the basic normal cone (3.6)
in Asplund spaces. To furnish the limiting process, we need additional compactness assumptions
involving Fnkhet normals. The following general condition was formulated in Mordukhovich and
Shao (1996c) although it has been actually used earlier for similar procedures.
Definition 3.6. Let 0 c X be a nonempty subset of the Banach space X and let x E 0. The set
0 is said to be sequentially normally compact (SNC) at x if for any sequence (xk, xhJ satisfying

one has

llxi::ll -+ 0 as

k-+

oo.

Sufficient conditions for SNC closed sets are provided by the 'compactly epi-Lipschitz' (CEL)
property introduced in Borwein and Strojwas (1985) as an extension of the epi-Lipschitzian behavior (2.6). Recently efficient characterizations of the CEL property were obtained in Borwein, Lucet
and Mordukhovich (2000) for closed convex sets in normed spaces. One of these characterizations
says that 0 is CEL if and only if its span is a finite-codimensional closed subspace and the relative
interior of 0 (with respect to its affine hull) is nonempty. In Ioffe (2000), other characterizations of
the CEL property are obtained for general closed sets in terms of normal cones satisfying certain
requirements in appropriate Banach spaces. Note that both SNC and CEL properties automatically
hold in finite dimensions but they may be different in infinite-dimensional spaces; see the recent
paper by Fabian and Mordukhovich (2001) for comprehensive results on the comparison between
these properties.
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Using the SNC property and following the proof of Theorem 3.6 in Mordukhovich and Shao
(1996b), we arrive at the limiting version of the extremal principle in terms of our basic normal
cone.
Corollary 3.7. Let x be a locally extremal point of the closed set system {0 1 , ... , On} in the
Asplund space X. Assume that all but one of the sets 0 1 , ... , On are sequentially normally compact
at x. Then there are (xi, ... , x~) ~ 0 satisfying (3.8) and

xi E N(x; Oi) for all i = 1, ... , n.

(3.10)

Due to the normal cone representation (3.4) in the case of convex sets, relations (3.8)-(3.10) of
the extremal principle for n = 2 reduce to the classical separation property
(3.11)
This means that the extremal principle ensures the separation property for two convex sets imposing
the SNC assumption on one of them instead of the more restrictive nonempty interior assumption in
the classical separation theorem. Note that Corollary 3. 7 provides the above relations only for locally
extremal points. However, the latter requirement holds automatically (or under mild assumptions)
in applications to various optimization problems, calculus rules in nonsmooth analysis, economic
models, etc.; see more discussions in Mordukhovich (2001). On the other hand, we can easily
check that the separation property (3.11) implies the local extremality of any point x E 01 n 02
for arbitrary closed sets. Thus, the result of Corollary 3. 7 turns out to be a proper variational
extension of the convex separation theorem to a broad nonconvex setting and, moreover, provides
an improvement of the classical results in the case of convex sets.
We refer the reader to Mordukhovich (2001) for more general analogs of the extremal principle
in fuzzy/ approximate and exact /limiting forms obtained in terms of abstract prenormal and normal
structures under minimal assumptions in appropriate Banach spaces.

4

Generalized Second Welfare Theorems for Pareto and Weak
Pareto Optimal Allocations

This section contains necessary conditions for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations of the
nonconvex economy £. Based on the extremal principle, we obtain necessary conditions for these
two types of Pareto optimal allocations in terms of the prenormal and nQrmal cones from Definition
3.1. The results obtained are presented in both approximate and exact forms of the generalized
second welfare theorem involving common nonzero marginal prices for all the preference and production sets. We discuss various corollaries and interpretations of the main results (including those
in terms of nonlinear prices) and derive new conditions of the price positivity for economies with
ordered commodity spaces.
First let us establish a generalized version of the second welfare theorem in the approximate
form for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations of £ under the corresponding net demand
qualification conditions of Definition 2.3.
Theorem 4.1. Let (x, y) be a Pareto (weak Pareto) local optimal al"location of the economy £
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with the Asplund commodity space E. Assume that the net demand qualification condition (resp.
net demand weak qualification condition) is satisfied at (x, y). Then for every c; > 0 there are
(x, y, w) E ITi= 1 clPi(x) x ITj= 1 clSj x clW and p* E E* \ {0} such that
-p* E N(xi; clPi(x))
p* E N(yj; clSj)

+ c:B* with Xi E Xi+ (c:/2)B for all

+ c:B* with Yj

p* E N(w; clW)

w is

+ (c:/2)B for all

+ c:B* with

1-c:
2)n + m + 1 :::;

where

E Yj

*

liP II :::;

wE

i = 1, ... , n,

j = 1, ... , m,

w + (c:/2)B,

(4.1)
(4.2)
(4.3)

1+c:
2)n + m + 1'

(4.4)

defined in (2.2).

Proof. We prove the theorem in a parallel way for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations
(x, y). Consider the product space X := En+m+l equipped with the norm

ll(vl, ... ,Vn+m+dllx:= [ llv1ll 2 +···+llvn+m+III 2] 1/2 ·

(4.5)

Since E is Asplund, the product space X is Asplund as well; see, e.g., Phelps (1993). Taking anumber c; > 0 for which the NDQ condition (resp. the NDWQ condition) holds with the corresponding
sequence {ek} in (2.5) and (2.4), we define the two closed sets in X as follows
n

m

i=l

j=l

n1 :=II [clPi(x) n (xi+ c:B)] x II [c1sj n (Yj + c:B)] x [c1w n (w + c:B)],
n

(4.6)

m

02:={(x,y,w)EXI 2:xi-2:Yj-w=O}.
i=l

(4.7)

j=l

Let us show that (x, fj, w) is a locally extremal point of the set system {01, 02} in (4. 6) and (4. 7). It
follows directly from Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 that (x, fj, w) E 01 nn2. To justify the local extremality
of (x, fj, w), it is sufficient to find a neighborhood U of this point and a sequence {ak} c X such
that ak --)- 0 as k --)- oo and
(01 - ak) n 02 n U =

0 for all large k E IN

(4.8)

under the corresponding qualification condition from Definition 2.3. To proceed, we take a neighborhood 0 E En+m of the Pareto (weak Pareto) optimal allocation (x, y) and a sequence {ek} C E
converging to zero for which either (2.4) or (2.5) is satisfied. In both cases we put U := 0 x IR C X
and ak := (0, ... , 0, ek) E X and show that (4.8) holds for the same k E IN as in (2.4) and (2.5).
Assuming the contrary, we find Zk E nl with Zk- ak E n2. Due to the structure of (4.6) and (4.7)
and the construction of ak and U, this implies the existence of (xk,Yk,wk) with (xk,Yk) E 0,

Xik E clPi(x) n (xi+ c:B), i

= 1, ... , n;
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Yjk E clSj n (fjj + c:B), j

= 1, ... , m,

wk E clW

n (w + cB),

and
n

m

2:.:: Xik - 2:.:: Yjk i=l

wk

+ ek =

0.

j=l

The latter means, due to (2.3), that 0 E 6." + ek. Consequently, the NDWQ condition ensures that
the right-hand side set in (2.4) contains the origin while the NDQ condition ensures that the origin
belongs to the right-hand side set in (2.5). This contradicts the weak Pareto local optimality of
(x, y) in the first case and the Pareto local optimality of this allocation in the second case. Thus
we have justified (4.8) and established the local extremality of (x, y, w) for the system of closed sets
{fh,D2} defined in (4.6) and (4.7) in the Asplund space X.
Now we can apply the fuzzy version of the extremal principle to this system of two sets. According to Theorem 3.5, for every c > 0 there are z = (xi, ... , Xn, YI, ... , Ym, w) E nl, E n2,

z

z* E N(z; ni), and z* E N(z; n2)

(4.9)

such that
Xi E Xi+

(c/2)B, i = 1, ... ,n; Yi E Yj

(1- c)/2:::; liz* II:::; (1

+ (c/2)B,

+ c)/2,

j = 1, ... ,m; wE w + (c/2)B,

and liz*+ z*ll:::; c/2.

(4.10)

(4.11)

Observe that the set n2 in (4.7) is a linear subspace separated in all the variables (xi, Yj, w).
Thus N(z; n2) is a subspace orthogonal to n2, and z* = (p*, ... ,p*, -p*, ... , -p*) in (4.9), where
the 'minus terms' start with the (n + 1)st position. It follows from (4.5) and (4.11) that
(1- c)/2:::;

Jn + m +

1IIP*II :::; (1

+ c)/2.

(4.12)

Then we conclude from (4.9) and the last estimate in (4.11) that
-z* = (-p*, ... ,-p*,p*, ... ,p*) E N(z;DI) +cB*.

(4.13)

Now we use Proposition 3.2 for the product set D1 and observe that by (4.10) all the components
(xi, Yj, w) of the point z in (4.13) belong to the interiors of the corresponding neighborhoods in (4.6);
hence these neighborhoods can be ignored in the calculation of N(z; DI). Finally combining (4.10),
(4.12), and (4.13), we arrive at relationships (4.1)-( 4.4) and complete the proof of the theorem. 0
Observe that, in contrast to the fuzzy extremal principle of Theorem 3.5 for the general extremal
system of closed sets, Theorem 4.1 ensures the existence of a common dual element p* E E* \ {0}
for all the sets involved in (4.1)-(4.3), instead of different elements xi in (3.7)-(3.9). This common
element, which can be interpreted as an approximate marginal price for all the preference and
production sets near Pareto optimal allocations, corresponds to the very essence of the classical
second welfare theorem ensuring the equality of marginal rates of substitution for consumers and
firms. Note that such a specification of the general extremal principle in the economic model under
consideration is proved to be possible due to the specific structure of sets (4.6) and (4. 7) in the
extremal system, especially due to the separated variables in (4. 7).
13

The results of Theorem 4.1 can be compared with a recent 'vi~cous' version of the generalized
second welfare theorem established in Jofre (2000) for the case of Pareto optimal allocations in
nonconvex economies with the 'market clear' condition W = { w}. The main result of the latter
paper is expressed in terms of an abstract subdifferential for Lipschitz continuous functions on a
Banach space under certain requirements. Observe that not all of these requirements (particularly
the subdifferential sum rule) are satisfied for the Frechet subdifferential in Asplund spaces that
generates the prenormal cone N(·; 0) through the distance function to n. Thus our Theorem 4.1
and Theorem 3 of Jofre (2000) are independent. The proof of the latter result is based on a subdifferential condition for boundary points of the sum of closed sets from Borwein and J ofre (1998),
which is an approximate version of the nonconvex separation property established in Borwein and
Jofre (1998) in finite dimensions as an extension of the unpublished result by Cornet and Rockafellar (1989). An abstract version of Theorem 4.1 that covers the mentioned result of Jofre is obtained
in Mordukhovich (2000) by using a more general fuzzy extremal principle.
Let us present some corollaries of Theorem 4.1 taking into account special descriptions of prenormal elements given in Section 3. First we consider economies with convex preference and production
sets. In this case relations (4.1) and (4.2) provide, respectively, global minimization (maximization)
of the perturbed consumer expenditures (firm profits) over the corresponding preference (production) sets.

Corollary 4.2. In addition to the assumptions of Theorem 4.1, we suppose that all the sets
Pi(x), i = 1, ... , n, and Sj, j = 1, ... , m, are convex. Then for every c; > 0 there are (x, y, w) E
Tif=dclPi(x) n (xi+ (c/2)B)] x Ilj=dclSj n (fjj + (c/2)B)] x clW and p* E E* \ {0} such that one
has (4.3), (4.4), and
(4.14)
(p*, Vj - Yj) ~

cllvj- Yjll

for all Vj E clSj, j

= 1, ... , m.

(4.15)

Proof. It follows directly from (4.1), (4.2), and the representation (3.5) of €-normals to convex
sets. D
Next we consider a general case of nonconvex economies and use the variational descriptions
of Frechet normals and €-normals from Proposition 3.3. In this way we obtain two nonconvex
counterparts of Corollary 4.2. The first one provides local analogs of relations (4.14) and (4.15) for
nonconvex economies, while the second statement ensures the existence of smooth functions whose
rate of change at €-optimal allocations approximately equals to the marginal price p* and which
achieve their global minimum (maximum) over the preference (production) sets at the €-optimal
allocations. Such functions can be interpreted as approximate nonlinear prices that support a
perturbed convex-type equilibrium in nonconvex models.

Corollary 4.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.1 the following hold:
(i) Given any c; > 0 and any 1 > 0, there are (x, y, w) E Ilf=dclPi(x) n (xi + (c/2)B)] x
TI~dclSj n (fjj + (c/2)B)] x clW, p* E E* \ {0}, and 'f} > 0 such that one has (4.3), (4.4), and

(p*,ui- Xi)~ -(c; +!)iiui- Xijj for all Ui E clPi(x)
14

n (xi+ 1].8),

i

= 1, ... ,n,

(ii) Let in addition E admit an S-smooth bump function from the classes S considered zn
Proposition 3.3. Then for every c > 0 there are (x, y, w) E Tii=IfclPi(x)n(xi+(c:/2)B)] x Tij=dclSjn
(fh + (c/2)B)] x clW and p* E E* \ {0} as well asS-smooth functions gi : E --+ IR (i = 1, ... , n)
and hj : E--+ IR (j = 1, ... , m) such that one has (4.3), (4.4), and

II'Vgi(xi)-p*ll ::;c, i=1, ... ,n; IIV'h(yj)-p*ll ::;c, j=1, ... ,m,
where gi achieves its global minimum over clPi(x) uniquely at Xi for all i = 1, ... , n, and hj achieves
its global maximum over clSj uniquely at Yj for all j = 1, ... , m. Moreover, we can choose 9i and
hj to be convex and concave respectively if E admits an equivalent Frechet smooth norm.
Proof. To prove (i), we first observe that

N(x; n) + c:B* c Nc:(x; n), c;::: o,
for any set n and then use Proposition 3.3(i) in (4.1) and (4.2). All the assertions in (ii) follow
from the assertions (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3.3 applied to (4.1) and (4.2). D
Now let us derive necessary optimality conditions for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations
of £ in the exact form of the generalized second welfare theorem. To do it, we need to impose
additional compactness assumptions that allow us to pass to the limit in the relations of Theorem
4.1. It happens that the sequential normal compactness of one among the preference, production,
or net demand constraint sets is sufficient for this purpose.
Theorem 4.4. Let (x, y) be a Pareto (resp. weak Pareto) locally optimal allocation of the economy
£ satisfying the corresponding assumptions of Theorem 4.1 with w defined in (2.2). Assume in
addition that either one of the sets clPi (x), i = 1, ... , n, or clSj, j = 1, ... , m, or cl W is sequentially
normally compact at Xi, '[jj, and w respectively. Then there is a nonzero price p* E E* satisfying
-p* E N(xi; clPi(x)) for all i = 1, ... , n,

p* E N(Yj; clSj) for all j

= 1, ... ,m,

p* E N(w; clW).

(4.16)

(4.17)

(4.18)

Proof. Let us prove this theorem by passing to the limit in the relations of Theorem 4.1. Pick an
arbitrary sequence C:k .-!- 0 ask --+ oo and, according to the latter result, find sequences (xk, Yk, wk) E
I1i= 1 clPi(x) x Tij= 1 clSj x clW and Pk E E* satisfying (4.1)-(4.4) with c: = Ek for each k E lN.
Obviously (xk, Yk. wk) --+ (x, '[j, w) as k --+ oo. Since E is Asplund and Pk are uniformly bounded
by (4.4), there is p* E E* such that the sequence {pk} converges top* in the weak-star topology of
E*. Now passing to the limit in (4.1)-(4.3) ask--+ oo and taking into account the representation
(3.6) of the basic normal cone in Asplund spaces, we arrive at all the relations (4.16)-(4.18).
It remains to prove that p* =F 0 if one of the sets clPi(x), clSj, and clW is sequentially normally
compact at the corresponding point. On the contrary, let p* = 0 and assume for definiteness that
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the set clW is sequentially normally compact at
such that

w. Then by

Pk- Ekek E N(wk; clW) with

lle'kll = 1

(4.3) there is a sequence of ej. E E*

for all k E IN.

(4.19)

Obviously pj.- Ekek ~ 0 as k-+ oo. By Definition 3.6 of SNC sets, we conclude from (4.19) that
IIP'k - Ekek II -+ 0 and hence IIP'k II -+ 0 as k -+ oo. The latter contradicts the left-hand inequality in
(4.4) for pj.. Thus p* i= 0, which completes the proof of the theorem.
0
We can see that Theorem 4.4 requires the sequential normal compactness of only one among
the preference, production, or net demand constraint sets while the limiting extremal principle of
Corollary 3.7 imposes the SNC assumption on all but one among these sets. Such an improvement
of the general result in the framework of the economic model £ becomes possible mostly due to the
separated structure of the set (4. 7) involved in the extremal system.
Let us present some corollaries of Theorem 4.4 and discuss its relations with other results in
this direction. First we consider a special case of£, where the net demand constraint set W admits
the representation

W = w + r with some w E clW.

(4.20)

When r = -E+ for ordered commodity spaces, representation (4.20) corresponds to the so-called
implicit free disposal of commodities. We consider a more general case of r being an arbitrary
convex cone in E and show that (4.18) implies in this case the following complementary slackness
condition, which economically can be interpreted as the zero value of excess demand at the marginal
price.
Corollary 4.5. In addition to the assumptions of Theorem 4.4, we suppose that W is given as
(4.20), where r is an nonempty convex subcone of E. Then there is a nonzero price p* E E*
satisfying (4.16), (4.17), and
n

(p*,

L

m

Xi -

i=l

L Yj -

w) = 0.

(4.21)

j=l

Proof. To justify (4.21), we observe that

(p*,w- w);::: (p*,w- w) for all wE clW

(4.22)

due to (4.18), (3.4), and (4.20). Hence (p*, w ~ w) ;::: 0. On the other hand, taking 2(w- w) E
w -w = r from the cone r, we get by (4.22) that (p*,w -w) ~ 0, i.e., (4.21) holds. 0
In the case of economies with convex preference and production sets, relations (4.16) and (4.17)
of Theorem 4.4 reduce to the classical consumer expenditure minimization and firm profit maximization conditions of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics in Arrow (1951) and
Debreu (1951). The corresponding corollary of Theorem 4.4 is formulated as follows.
Corollary 4.6.

In addition to the assumptions of Theorem 4.4, we suppose that all the sets
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Pi(x), i = 1, ... , n, and Sj, j
satisfying (4.18) and such that

=

1, ... , m, are convex. Then there is a nonzero price p* E E*

Xi minimizes (p*, Xi) over

ih

Xi

E clPi(xi) Vi= 1, ... , n,

maximizes (p*, Yj) over Yj E clSj Vj

= 1, ... , m.

(4.23)
(4.24)

Proof. This follows directly from (4.16) and (4.17) due to the normal cone representation (3.4)
for convex sets.

0

We have from Proposition 2.4 and the discussion after Definition 3.6 that all the assumptions
of Theorem 4.4 automatically hold for weak Pareto (resp. Pareto) optimal allocations if one of the
sets Pi(x), or Sj, or W (resp. clPi(x)) is epi-Lipschitzian at the reference points, which corresponds
to their nonempty interiors in the case of convex sets. For convex economies with finite-dimensional
commodity spaces, the qualification and normal compactness conditions of Theorem 4.4 hold with
no interiority assumptions; cf. Debreu (1959) and Cornet (1986). So Corollary 4.6 provides a
proper generalization of the classical results of convex welfare economics.
For nonconvex economies [, Theorem 4.4 improves the results of Khan (1999) and Cornet
(1990) obtained in terms of the normal cone (3.3) for W = { w} and W = w - IR+ respectively.
Note that, in the nonconvex case, relations (4.16) and (4.17) give first-order necessary conditions
for consumer's expenditure minimization (4.23) and firm's profit maximization (4.24). Relations
of this type are called marginal pricing quasi-equilibrium formalized in terms of the corresponding
normal cone; cf. Guesnerie (1975) and Cornet (1990).
A version of Theorem 4.4 for nonconvex 'markets clear' economies is presented in Jofre (2000)
under the CEL assumption on one of the preference or production se~s and an additional robustness
(closed graph) subdifferential requirement that holds when E is weakly compactly generated (hence
admits a Frechet smooth renorm) in the framework of Theorem 4.4. Jofre's result also holds in
general Banach spaces in terms of bigger Ioffe's and Clarke's normal cones (or the corresponding
subdifferentials of the-distance function); see the discussions in Section 3. The latter result improves
a generalized version of the second welfare theorem obtained in Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988) in
terms of Clarke's normal cone under the epi-Lipschitzian property of one of the sets involved.
Other extensions of the second welfare theorem for a general economic model with private and
public goods are given in Flam and Jourani (2001) through an abstract subdifferential satisfying
full calculus, robustness, and compactness requirements close the ones in to Jofre (2000). These
requirements basically restrict the class of subdifferentials and normal cones to those listed above,
and they do not cover the general framework of Theorem 4.4. More relaxed requirements are
imposed in Mordukhovich (2000), where the reader can find an abstract version of Theorem 4.4
with further discussions.
Next let us consider a special case of our economic model [ when the commodity space E is
an ordered Banach space with the closed positive cone E+ := { e E El e 2: 0}. The associate closed
positive cone E+ of the dual space E* admits the representation
E~ := {e* E E*l e* 2: 0} = {e* E E*l (e*,e) 2:0 for all e E E+},

(4.25)

where the order on E* is induced by the given one 2: on E. The next theorem of presents natural
conditions of the free-disposal type ensuring the positivity of marginal prices in the framework of
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Theorem 4.4. The proof is based on the following lemma, established in Malcolm and Mordukhovich
(2001), that exploits specific features of the basic normal cone (3.2) in Banach spaces.

Lemma 4. 7. Let E be an ordered Banach space and D C E a nonempty closed subset satisfying
the condition

(4.26)
Then one has

N(e; D)

c

E~

for every e ED.

(4.27)

Theorem 4.8. Let (x, y) be a Pareto (resp. weak Pareto) locally optimal allocation of the economy
E. In addition to the corresponding assumptions of Theorem 4.4, we suppose that E is an ordered
space and one of the following conditions holds:
(a) There is i E {1, ... ,n} such that the i-th consumer satisfies the desirability assumption at
x, i.e.,

(b) There is j E { 1, ... , m} such that the j -th firm satisfies the free-disposal assumption, z. e.,

(c) The net demand constraint set W exhibits implicit free disposal of commodities, i.e.,
clW - E+

c

clW.

Then there is a positive marginal price p* E E~ \ {0} satisfying (4.16)-(4.18).

Proof. The marginal price positivity p* E E~ in cases (b) and (c) follows directly from Lemma 4.7
due to (4.17) and (4.18). Case (a) reduces to the same proposition due to (4.16) and the property

N(e; D) = -N( -e; -D) for every D

c

E and e ED

valid in any Banach space. To check this property, it is sufficient to use (3.2) and formula (3.1) for
the set of c--normals. D
Observe that each of the conditions in (a)-(c) implies the epi-Lipschitzian property of the
corresponding sets clPi(x), clSj, and clW provided that intE+ f= 0. Due to the discussions above,
the latter assumption ensures also the fulfillment of the qualification and normal compactness
conditions of Theorem 4.4 and thus the existence of a positive price p* E E+ \ {0} in Theorem 4.8.
Note that Theorem 4.8 substantially improves, in the Asplund space setting, the main result
in Khan (1991) formalized in terms of a bigger Ioffe's normal cone, where W = w - E+, both
conditions (a) and (b) hold for all i = 1, ... , nand j = 1, ... , m respectively, and every preference
and production set is assumed to be epi-Lipschitzian. Moreover, we do not need a lattice structureenhanced versions of the commodity space, reflexive preference relations, and strong Pareto
optimum requirements imposed in that paper.
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5

Generalized Second Welfare Theorems f«?r Strong Pareto Optimal Allocations

In the final section of this paper we obtain some advanced results of the second welfare theorem
type for strong Pareto optimal allocations in economies with ordered commodity spaces. It turns
out that such allocations have certain specific features in comparison with Pareto and weak Pareto
optimal allocations. Namely, we are able to establish for them, based on the extremal principle,
enhanced versions of the generalized second welfare theorem in both approximate and exact forms
without any qualification conditions.
The next theorem presents the main results in this direction. A part of the this theorem is
obtained for Banach spaces ordered by their generating closed positive cones: E = E+- E+. Note
that this class is sufficiently large including, in particular, all Banach lattices (or normed complete
Riesz spaces) whose generating positive cones typically have empty interiors.
Theorem 5.1. Let (x, y) be a strong Pareto local optimal allocation of the economy E: with an
ordered Asplund commodity space E, and let the sets Sj, W be locally closed near Yj and w,
respectively. Then one has the following assertions:
(i) Assume that the closed positive cone E+ is generating and that either
(5.1)

holds, or the free-disposal condition

(5.2) .
holds for some j E { 1, ... , m}, or n > 1 and there is a nonsatiated consumer io E { 1, ... , n}
satisfying the desirability condition
(5.3)

for some i E {1, ... , n} \ {io}. Then for every c > 0 there are (x, y, w) E ITi=l clPi(x) x ITj= 1 Sj x W
and p* E E* satisfying relations (4.1)-(4.4).
.
(ii) If in addition to (i) one of the sets clPi(x), i = 1, ... , n, or Sj, J. = 1, ... , m, or W zs
sequentially normally compact at the corresponding points, then there is a marginal price p* E
E* \ {0} satisfying relations (4.16)-(4.18).
(iii) All the conclusions in (i) and (ii) hold if, instead of the assumption that E+ is a generating
cone, we assume that E+ -::1 {0} and at least two among the sets W, Sj, j = 1, ... , m, and
Pi(x), i = 1, ... , n, satisfy the corresponding conditions in (5.1)-(5.3).
Proof. Let us consider the system of two sets {0 1 , 0 2 } defined in (4.6) and (4.7), where the
closure operation for Sj and W in (4. 7) can be omitted since these sets are locally closed around
the points of interest. Taking a strong Pareto local optimum (x, y) of£, we are going to show that
(x, y, w) E 01 n 02 is a locally extremal point of {01, 02} if either the assumptions in (i) or those in
(iii) hold. Thus these assumptions replace the corresponding net demand qualification conditions
in the proof of Theorem 4.1 for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations.
First let us consider case (i) when the positive cone E+ is generating and either one of the sets
W, Sj, and Pi(x) satisfies the corresponding condition in (5.1)-(5.3). For definiteness we assume
that (5.1) holds; the other two cases can be treated similarly.
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It is easy to observe that w is a boundary point of W; otherwise we get a contradiction with
Pareto optimality of (x, y) under our underlying assumption that at least one of the consumers is
nonsatiated. So we find a sequence ek ---+ 0 in E satisfying w + ek ~ W for all k E JN. Due to the
classical Krein-Smulian theorem (see the survey in Abramovich, Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1992)
for a nice proof, discussions, and references), in any Banach space E ordered by a closed generating
cone there exists a constant M > 0 such that for each e E E there are positive vectors

u, vEE+ with e = u- v and max{llull, llvll} :::; Mllell·

This allows us to find sequences Uk ~ 0 and Vk ~ 0 satisfying ek
W-E+ C W, we easily get

w + uk ~

W with Uk

= Uk -

Vk· Since Vk E E+ and

~ 0 as k ---+ oo.

(5.4)

Now take a neighborhood 0 C En+m from the definition of the strong Pareto local optimal
allocation (x, y) and show that condition (4.8) is satisfied with the sequence of ak := (0, ... , 0, uk) E
En+m+ 1 and the neighborhood U := 0 x E. This will justify the local extremality of (x, y, w) for
{01' 02}·
Assuming that (4.8) does not hold for some k E JN, we find (xk, Yk, wk) E 02 such that (xk, Yk) E
0 and (xk, Yk, wk- uk) E 01. Due to uk E E+ and condition (5.1), the latter implies that
n

m

L

Xik - L

i=1

Ykj = Wk - Uk E

w-

E+

c w

(5.5)

j=1

for the components of (xk,Yk)· This means that (xk,Yk) is a feasible allocation of£ belonging
to the prescribed neighborhood of (x, y). Since (x, y) is a strong Pareto optimum of £, we get
(xk. Yk) = (x, Y) for all large k E JN. Thus
n

m

n

w + uk = L X i - LYj + uk = L
i=1

j=1

i=1

m

Xik- LYjk

+ uk = (wk- uk) + uk = Wk

E W,

j=l

which contradicts (5.4) and proves the local extremality of (x,y,w) for {0 1 ,0 2 } in case (i).
Let us prove this in case (iii) assuming for definiteness that (5.19) holds and one of the production
sets (say 81) satisfies the free-disposal condition (5.20). Choose a sequence Uk ~ 0 with uk =I 0
for all k E JN, which is always possible due to E+ =I {0}. Now we form the sequence ak :=
(0, ... , 0, uk) E X and show that the extremality condition (5.7) holds along this sequence with
U := 0 x E. Assuming the contrary and repeating the arguments above, we find (xk. Yk, wk) E
02 n U satisfying (5.23). The latter implies that (xk, Yk) = (x, y) for all large k E 1N since (x, y) is
a strong Pareto local optimum. It follows from (5.23) in this case that
n

L
i=l

m

Xik - (Ylk - Uk) - L

Ykj

= Wk E w

(5.6)

j=2

for all k E JN sufficiently large. Due to (5.20) for j = 1 we have Ylk- uk E 81, and (5.24) ensures
that (xk, Yk - (uk, 0, ... , 0)) is a feasible allocation of £ belonging to the prescribed neighborhood
of the strong Pareto local optimum (x, y). This implies that Ylk - Uk == Y1 - Uk = Yl, i.e., uk = 0
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for all large k E N, a contradiction. Thus we have justified the local extremality of (x, fj, w) for
{0 1 , 0 2 } in case (iii). Now we can apply the extremal principle of Theorem 3.2 to this system of
sets and get all the conclusions of the theorem in the way of proving Theorems 5.1 and 5.2. 0
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